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High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Ass’n v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. Adv.
Op. 66 (Sept. 27, 2017) (en banc)1
PROPERTY LAW: REPRESENTATIONAL STANDING
Summary
Under NRS Chapters 40 and 116, homeowners associations (HOAs) have the
representational standing to represent all homeowners who purchase their homes after litigation
is commenced by or against the HOAs. However, the Court clarified that there is no such
representational standing to bring or continue to pursue a case on behalf of homeowners who sell
their units after litigation has begun.2
Background3
High Noon at Arlington Ranch HOA (High Noon) commenced this litigation against D.R.
Horton in June 2007 alleging four claims: (1) breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality
and habitability; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of express warranties; and (4) breach of
fiduciary duty. D.R. Horton moved for partial summary judgment in January 2014 arguing that
when High Noon filed its complaint, only 112 of its 342 members owned units, meaning that High
Noon’s standing should be decreased to those 112 units. Also, D.R. Horton argued that, for the
same reason, a subclass of 192 High Noon units for interior claims’ purposes should be decreased
to 62 units.
The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada granted partial summary judgment in favor
of D.R. Horton, determining that High Noon could not bring claims on behalf of 230 former unit
owners because they were not real parties in interest in the litigation.4 However, former owners
could still recover damages suffered in connection with loss of property market value and repair
expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred by former owners.5 The district court also concluded that
High Noon representational standing was allowed for subsequent owners of units with existing or
continuing construction defects.
Discussion
Writ relief is appropriate
Generally, the Court does not consider partial summary judgment orders because they are
interlocutory lower court orders. However, here, the Court used its discretion and considered the
district court’s partial summary judgment order because it raised an important issue. By granting
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By Homero Gonzalez.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.3102(1)(d) (2007). The Court applied the 2007 version of the Nevada Revised Statutes
because High Noon filed its complaint against D.R. Horton in June of 2007.
3
The Nevada Supreme Court pointed-out that this opinion contains only the relevant facts because the case was
pending for eight years, and the parties filed multiple motions and writ petitions.
4
See NEV. R. CIV. P. 17 (2017) (requiring that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest.”).
5
See NEV. REV. STAT § 40.655 (2007) (listing the remedies a claimant can recover for damages “proximately
caused by a constructional defect”).
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its discretion, the Court addressed both the legal question at hand and resolved an issue that
affected other similar litigation.
High Noon’s claims for relief
The Court first addressed High Noon’s complaint. The Court pointed out that the district
court ruled on standing without considering each claim alleged in High Noon’s complaint. To
determine standing, the correct analysis requires that each claim High Noon alleged in its
complaint relate to the construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40, which were transferred
from former unit owners to new unit owners once the unit sale became final. The four claims High
Noon alleged in its complaint were: (1) breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and
habitability6; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of express warranties; and (4) breach of fiduciary
duty.
The Court defined “constructional defect” as
a defect in the design, construction, manufacture,
repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an
alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or
of an appurtenance and includes, without limitation,
the design, construction, manufacture, repair or
landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or
addition to an existing residence, or of an
appurtenance:
1. Which is done in violation of law, including,
without limitation in violation of local codes or
ordinances.7
The Court declined to address the claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties,
and breach of implied warranty of habitability because these claims were not related to
construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40. However, the Court found that the claims of
breach of implied warranty of workmanlike quality and breach of express warranty were
construction defect claims under NRS Chapter 40, even though High Noon’s complaint stated
these claims arose out of NRS Chapter 116. The Court reasoned that NRS 40.600 to 40.695 take
precedence over any other conflicting law related to construction defects8 and that these provisions
applied to “any” construction defect claims.9
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The actual claim was breach of warranty of workmanlike quality and habitability. However, in its discussion, the
Court analyzed habitability and workmanlike quality separately because they were separate concepts, and were thus
treated differently for purposes of determining whether or not each was a construction defect claim under chapter 40
of the Nevada Revised Statutes. In short, habitability was not, but workmanlike quality was.
7
NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.615 (2007).
8
NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.635(2) (2007).
9
Gonski v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 126 Nev. 551, 562, 245 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2010).
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Under the then-existing statute, homeowners’ associations have standing to represent unit owners
who purchase units after litigation begins
NRS 116.3102(1)(d) grants HOAs representational standing rights. The only caveat is that
the HOA seeking representational standing can only do so if it acts on behalf of two or more of its
members, and that the actions sought concern the community.10 What makes this a prima facie
case is that NRS 116.3102(1)(d) does not expressly state whether or not representational standing
applies to a person who buys a residential unit from a seller who was involved in the HOA’s
ongoing litigation. The Court found that because NRS 116.095 defined a unit owner as a person
currently owning a unit, and because there was no restriction placed on subsequent unit owners, it
then followed that an HOA has representational standing of subsequent unit owners who become
current owners, but not of former owners who are no longer members of the HOA that brought the
claim to court.11
Furthermore, the Court rejected D.R. Horton’s argument that High Noon’s representational
standing was limited to the people who owned the units at the time High noon filed suit. By
considering the Legislature’s intent behind passing NRS 116.3012(1)(d), the Court found that, as
a matter of policy, not allowing High Noon representational standing for subsequent unit owners
would have yielded unreasonable results.12 The Court also provided specific examples supporting
this conclusion by comparing it to what NRS Chapter 4013 states and what other cases within
Nevada and other jurisdictions have also concluded.
Homeowners’ associations do not have standing to continue to represent unit owners who sell
units after litigation begins
The Court addressed D.R. Horton’s argument that High Noon should not retain its
representational standing over former unit owners because they were no longer members of High
Noon.14 The Court agreed with D.R. Horton’s argument. First, HOA representational standing only
applies to current residential unit owners, and former unit owners are no longer members of the
HOA that commenced litigation. Also, High Noon’s “Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions” made
it clear that the HOA’s benefits, including any litigation it may bring on behalf of owners, applied
only to current High Noon members and not prior members.
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Beazer Homes Holding Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. 723, 731, 291 P.3d 128, 134 (2012).
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.095 (2007) (defining “unit’s owner” as “a declarant or other person who owns a
unit.”).
12
Barney v. Mt. Rose Heating & Air Conditioning, 124 Nev. 821, 826, 192 P.3d 730, 734 (2008).
13
Again, chapter 40 of the Nevada Revised Statutes overrides what any other chapter states regarding claims of
constructional defects.
14
D.R. Horton actually requested the Nevada Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s
finding that an HOA could continue to represent its former members, but D.R. Horton made this request in its
answer rather than in an actual petition. Typically, the Nevada Supreme Court declines to consider these issues, but
when the error is already apparent in the record, the Court may exercise its discretion sua sponte and address, or
even rule on that error. Mainor v. Nault, 120 Nev. 750, 774, 101 P.3d 308, 324 (2004) (as corrected on denial of
rehearing (Apr. 13, 2005)) (quoting Crow-Spieker #23 v. Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dew Co., 103 Nev. 1, 3, 731
P.2d 348, 350 (1987)).
11
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Conclusion
High Noon’s representational standing of current unit owners is valid. This includes
representational standing on behalf of new residential unit purchasers who became current High
Noon members, even though litigation had already begun. However, High Noon may not begin or
continue litigation on behalf of its former members. The Court issued the writ of mandamus
vacating the grant of partial summary judgment and ordered the district court to reconsider the
partial summary judgment motion consistent with this opinion.
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